01 / threat model

Before anything else:
who's actually after you?

Every tool on this page is useless without a threat model. That's not jargon. It means: who might want your data, what can they realistically do to get it, and what happens if they do? Answer that first. Then pick tools.

"I want fewer ad trackers" and "I need to keep a source safe" are not the same problem and they don't have the same solution. The first is handled with a browser extension and a VPN. The second requires a completely different posture around devices, communications, and identity. If you don't know which camp you're in, you're probably over-engineering the wrong things.

02 / vpn + routing

VPN & Routing

A VPN moves trust. It shifts who can see your traffic from your ISP to the VPN provider. That's the whole thing. It does not make you anonymous. If your browser is signed into Google when you open a new tab, you're still identifiable regardless of what's running in the background.

What it's actually useful for: hiding activity from your ISP, reducing local network exposure, untrusted wifi, bypassing regional blocks. After setup, run a leak test. browserleaks.com and ipleak.net are fine. Confirm DNS isn't still resolving through your ISP.

What a VPN doesn't protect Browser fingerprinting, cookies, account sessions, metadata, behavioral patterns, compromised endpoints. The trust shifts from your ISP to the VPN operator. It doesn't disappear. If they log and hand over data, you have nothing.
use this

No account required. You get a random number, no email, no name. Pay cash or Monero if you want. WireGuard and OpenVPN both well-implemented. Audits are published. If you're being serious about this, Mullvad is the answer.

no accountwireguardauditedmoneroRAM servers
recommended

Swiss jurisdiction, open-source clients, independently audited. Secure Core bounces your traffic through an extra hop in a privacy-friendly country before it exits. Useful if exit-node correlation is in your threat model. Works well with the Proton ecosystem.

swiss lawopen sourcemulti-hopaudited
Anonymisation
situational

Three relays. Traffic encrypted between each one. No single relay knows both who you are and what you're requesting. Right tool when you actually need network-level anonymity rather than just ISP privacy. Slow by design. Use it when you need it.

Note: exit nodes can be operated by governments or other interested parties. Anonymity is probabilistic, not guaranteed.

3-hoponion routingfree
Amnesic OS
recommended

Boots from USB. Routes everything through Tor. Leaves nothing on the host when you shut down. Right tool when you need a clean session from hardware you don't fully trust. Journalists in hostile environments use it for a reason.

amnesictor-onlylive USB
VPNs to skip entirely Anything recently acquired by a data broker (look up Kape Technologies' portfolio). Anything with no published audit. Anything whose "no logs" policy hasn't been tested under legal pressure. Marketing copy isn't evidence. If the ad budget is larger than the infrastructure budget, you already know the answer.
03 / dns

DNS & Resolvers

Before any request goes anywhere, a DNS lookup happens. Your default ISP resolver logs every single one. Even if your HTTP traffic is encrypted, your resolver knows exactly what domains you're hitting and when.

Switch to an encrypted resolver using DoH or DoT, and pick one that doesn't log. If you're on a VPN, confirm DNS resolves through it. Check at dnsleaktest.com.

ResolverProtocolLogsOperatorNotes
Mullvad DNS DoH, DoT + none Mullvad (SE) Ad/tracker blocking variants available. Pairs best with Mullvad VPN obviously.
NextDNS DoH, DoT, DoQ ~ opt-out NextDNS Inc (US/EU) Very configurable. Disable logging in settings first thing. Good blocklist control.
Quad9 DoH, DoT + none Non-profit (CH) Swiss data protection. Blocks known malware domains by default. Solid general use.
Cloudflare 1.1.1.1 DoH, DoT ~ 25h purge Cloudflare (US) Fast. KPMG-audited. Fine for most. But Cloudflare is already in the path for a lot of the web.
ISP default plain UDP/53 x full logs your ISP Logged, monetised, legally accessible. Replace it.
04 / communications

Secure Comms

End-to-end encryption is the floor, not the ceiling. Metadata, who you talk to, how often, what times, is often more useful to an adversary than the actual message content. Pick tools that minimise both.

For most people Signal is the right call. For email, Proton. The cases where you need more than that are specific and you'll know why you're in them when you are.

Messaging
use this

The Signal Protocol is the gold standard for messaging encryption. WhatsApp licensed it, which tells you something. Open source, audited, minimal metadata collection. Disappearing messages, sealed sender, note-to-self. Registration requires a phone number. Use a VoIP number if identity separation is part of your setup.

e2eeopen sourcedisappearing msgsaudited
Email
recommended

Zero-access encryption at rest. Proton can't read your inbox. Swiss jurisdiction. Has a .onion address. Sign up over Tor if you want a clean identity. E2EE only applies when both parties are on Proton or you're using PGP. The to/from/subject header is still metadata regardless.

zero-accessswiss law.onion
Email
recommended

German jurisdiction, open-source clients. Encrypts the subject line which is unusual and genuinely useful. Good Proton alternative if you want to diversify or prefer being under EU regulatory scope. Calendar and contacts encrypted too.

subject encryptedgerman lawopen source
Email Aliases
recommended

Generate email aliases that forward to your real address. Never hand out your actual inbox again. Service gets breached, you kill the alias. Owned by Proton now, integrates cleanly. Addy.io is the alternative if you want self-hostable.

aliasesproton-ownedbreach containment
Decentralised Chat
situational

Federated. You can run your own homeserver. E2EE in DMs and private rooms, cross-signing for device verification. Good when coordinating a team without depending on a commercial provider. More setup than Signal, justified when the control matters.

self-hostablefederatede2ee
Don't run sensitive things through these Telegram: no E2EE by default on groups, stores everything server-side, cooperates with authorities more than the marketing implies. Discord: full content logging, US company, readily cooperates with law enforcement. WhatsApp: cloud backups may not be encrypted depending on settings, Meta owns all the metadata. iMessage: fine for most, but legal process reaching Apple costs you everything.
05 / identity

Identity Hygiene

Compartmentalisation means keeping identities separated so that a breach of one doesn't unravel the others. Not paranoia. Blast radius management.

The most common failure mode isn't technical. Someone builds a careful setup, then reuses an old email or a username that traces back to a real name somewhere from 2015. One thread. Everything unravels.

06 / devices + OS

Devices & Operating Systems

Software security means nothing when the hardware or OS is compromised. Most people can get most of the way there with full-disk encryption, a sane OS config, and not running random executables as root. That's already more than most do.

recommended

Each app, browser session, and network zone runs in its own Xen VM. A browser compromise can't touch your work files because they're in a separate VM entirely. Disposable VMs for one-off tasks. Hardware requirements are real, learning curve is real. Worth it when your threat model calls for it.

VM isolationxendisposable VMscompartments
Mobile OS
recommended

Hardened Android fork, Pixel hardware only. Hardened memory allocator, verified boot, per-app network/sensor/storage permissions, sandboxed Google Play that you can install or skip entirely. Right answer for a private Android phone. Install from their installer. Don't flash random builds from forums.

pixel onlyverified bootsandboxed appshardened alloc
Full Disk Encryption
mandatory

LUKS2 with Argon2id on Linux. VeraCrypt cross-platform, or if you need hidden volumes for plausible deniability. FDE protects against physical seizure. It does nothing to a running system or a compromised OS. Enable it, use a strong passphrase, don't leave machines unlocked and unattended.

LUKS2VeraCrypthidden volumes
Firmware
advanced

Replaces proprietary BIOS/UEFI with open firmware. Heads adds measured boot and TPM attestation so you can verify the boot chain hasn't been tampered with. Relevant if physical interdiction or supply-chain firmware compromise is in scope. Specific ThinkPad models only.

open firmwaremeasured bootThinkPad
07 / passwords + 2fa

Passwords & Auth

Unique password for every account. No exceptions. If that sounds like a lot of effort, that's what password managers are for. One service gets breached with a reused credential and it gets tested against your email, bank, and everything else within hours. Credential stuffing is automated and runs constantly.

Password Manager
recommended

Open source, audited, zero-knowledge. Self-host with Vaultwarden if you want to remove the server trust entirely. Works everywhere. Use a long Diceware passphrase for the master. Enable a hardware key for vault access.

open sourceauditedself-hostableFIDO2
Password Manager (offline)
recommended

Fully offline. Vault is an encrypted file you sync yourself. Syncthing handles this well. Nothing touches a server anywhere. FIDO2 hardware key unlock supported. Right choice when you don't want to trust any cloud infrastructure with your credentials.

offlineopen sourceFIDO2
Hardware Key
recommended

FIDO2 hardware key. Phishing-resistant because authentication binds to the specific origin. A fake site can't intercept it. Buy direct from Yubico. Get two: one to use, one backup somewhere secure. Enable on every high-value account that supports it.

FIDO2phishing-resistanthardware
Hardware Key (alt)
alternative

Open-source hardware alternative to YubiKey. Firmware is fully auditable. Also works as a hardware OpenPGP card. German company. Good choice if open hardware is part of your model.

open hardwareFIDO2OpenPGP
Get off SMS 2FA where you can SIM swapping requires almost no technical skill. Social engineer a carrier support agent and it's done. If you're protecting anything valuable, move to TOTP or a hardware key. Any account that only offers SMS 2FA should be treated as having no meaningful 2FA at all.
08 / browser fingerprinting

Browser Fingerprinting

Modern tracking doesn't need cookies or IP addresses. Browsers leak subtle signals: screen resolution, installed fonts, GPU rendering behaviour, timezone offsets, how graphics are drawn. The Canvas API gets abused to generate stable identifiers because different hardware, drivers, and software stacks produce slightly different pixel outputs.

Network anonymity tools help but the browser is often the strongest identifier in the chain. A unique browser can be tracked right through routing privacy layers.

Browser
recommended

Designed to reduce fingerprinting entropy on the clearnet. Applies Tor Browser-style hardening without requiring the Tor network. Defaults tuned to make users look similar to each other rather than unique. Pairs well with a VPN. Not a routing anonymity tool.

anti-fingerprintclearnethardened defaultsTor-style design
Browser
recommended

Currently the most mature anti-fingerprinting implementation available. Standardises window size, blocks identification APIs, isolates sites into separate contexts, reduces entropy from rendering behaviour. Both network and browser layer protection in one.

anti-fingerprintsite isolationnetwork + browser
Browser
needs work

Can be made reasonably private with configuration. Disable telemetry. Keep extensions minimal. Consider canvas permission prompts and fingerprint-resisting settings. Out of the box it's not there, but it's the most configurable mainstream option.

open sourceneeds hardeningextension hygiene
On fingerprinting defence No perfect defence exists. The goal is entropy reduction: make your browser look like everyone else's rather than uniquely yours. Standardised configs beat heavily customised ones. Avoid exotic fonts, unusual screen setups, or extension overload when privacy is the goal.
09 / field practice

Operational Practice

The tools are easy. The habits are the hard part. Most operational failures aren't technical. Someone forgets which identity they were using. They get comfortable and skip a step. They reuse something across contexts once because it seemed fine at the time.

On "good enough" security Perfect security doesn't exist. The goal is making compromise cost more than you're worth to whoever's after you. For most people, a few solid habits, unique passwords, a VPN, Signal, encrypted devices, is enough to stop casual threats entirely. You don't need Qubes OS if your threat model is ad tracking. Match the tool to the actual threat.